Re: Independent Review of Rail Safety Arrangements in Australia

["John Kerley" <deaftech@ozemail.com.au>]

Exnarc <gwrly@netspace.net.au> wrote in message
847tdk$2tg7$1@otis.netspace.net.au">news:847tdk$2tg7$1@otis.netspace.net.au...
>
> Notagunzel <notagunzel@bigfoot.com> wrote in message
> m%I94.76$Ad1.6748@nsw.nnrp.telstra.net">news:m%I94.76$Ad1.6748@nsw.nnrp.telstra.net...
> > Exnarc <gwrly@netspace.net.au> wrote in message
> > 845ckv$2i2r$1@otis.netspace.net.au">news:845ckv$2i2r$1@otis.netspace.net.au...
> > > John Kerley <deaftech@ozemail.com.au> wrote in message
> > > jBk94.2700$n23.9002@ozemail.com.au">news:jBk94.2700$n23.9002@ozemail.com.au...
> >
>  <snip>
> >
> > > Actually I don't recall ever hearing of a train entering a ST&T
section
> > > without the "Acre" being received, (It may have happened but it is so
> rare
> > > that I can't recall it ever happening in my 37 year on the job)!!!
> >
> > Gee you don't get around much...|-)
>
> Probably a lot more than you mate???
>
> Maybe I only listen to facts not rumors???
>
>
> > Hillside managed to send a spark on the up from Hurstbridge without
> anything a while ago, and another railway has big problems with ACRE
> messages. (but I've already said to much)
>
> Maybe you have?
>
> Whilst I don't know the facts, it sounds like the human element not the
Acre
> message was at fault.
>
Yes, Bob, this is what the whole debate is about.  We are all but human and
hence human error is inevitable.  Therefore systems should be designed as
far as possible to mitigate the effect of human error by having other checks
in place.  i.e. it should take more than one error to cause a disaster.

 With "Acre" messages it only takes the signaller to be distracted and
forget that he has not received the "Acre", to hand over the staff to the
driver.  Given that at most places where S&T is in use, the signaller is
also responsible for station duties, it is not surprising that the
occasional
train gets sent out without the "Acre" having been received.  It is an
inherent weakness in the system and hence one of the reasons for the
previous requirement to protect in the rear when travelling on ticket.

It is also not surprising that you, as a driver, would be unaware of this
happening.  Unless you actually came across a train ahead of you in the
section (and I have heard of at least one instance of this happening in
country Victoria), you would not know if you had been sent out without an
"Acre".  The signaller at the dispatching station is not going to advertise
the fact and the one at receiving station will think "Gee, that train came
through the section quickly!"

With the Ararat disaster, we have an example of what happens when the
additional checks have been removed and where just one error, opening the
points without the section authority, caused an accident which could have
been many times worse if it  had been a passenger train ploughing into 800
tons of ballast.

That there is no form of interlocking between releasing the key for the
points and the issuing of the section authority, in this an electrical
release by the train controller, in my view verges on the criminally
negligent.  Alternatively, measures such as providing home signals detected
through plunger locked points, such as I noted at Hattah on this year's
Steamrail trip to Mildura would provide the necessary protection.

The current rampage of designalling stations and destaffing stations and
trains, hence placing all the responsibility on the human frailty of one
person, will ensure the Ararat is just one of many disasters to come.

Rail travel in Victoria, indeed in Australia, has become much less safe
under the rule of the "economic rationalists".

Not so cheerful,

John Kerley