Re: Independent Review of Rail Safety Arrangements in Australia

["Exnarc" <gwrly@netspace.net.au>]

John Kerley <deaftech@ozemail.com.au> wrote in message
jBk94.2700$n23.9002@ozemail.com.au">news:jBk94.2700$n23.9002@ozemail.com.au...
<snip>
> > Doo and Train Staff & Ticket, (In Vic) we run it all the time on the
> > Hurstbridge Line,
> > If you haven't got the "Acre" Message you can't let another tain in the
> > section to run up the rear of the first, we don't have time interval
since
> > DOO was introduced.
> >
> But what if the next train is let into the section without the "Acre"
being
> received? ( a not unknown occurrence and the biggest shortcoming in the
S&T system).

Why do we risk flying?? The Pilot might take off without permission, or
someone might Hi-jack the plane??

TS&T is like all systems that rely on the human element some where along the
way, what use is it if the guard or Second Person/Co Driver who is supposed
to, forgets or is to lazy to be bothered to protect in the rear??

Actually I don't recall ever hearing of a train entering a ST&T section
without the "Acre" being received, (It may have happened but it is so rare
that I can't recall it ever happening in my 37 year on the job)!!!

> I suppose on today's railway with destaffing and removal of previously
> existing safety systems, management can blame it on "human error" and dump
> it all on the poor blighter who made the mistake even though previously
> existing preventative  systems had been removed.

Removal of guards hasn't changed anything on TS&T, you still needed the
Staff or after the "Acre"," the Ticket, the only thing missing with 2 man
crewing or DOO is the "Notice of Train Ahead" form.

>The management scapegoating of the poor blighter at Ararat in today's press
>is the latest example of this.

I agree, however it still comes down to one thing, if the guy had done his
job, (or more to the point) if he had let the qualified guys do their job
instead of pre-empting the move Ararat would not have happened.

The system at Ararat left a lot to be desired, but in the end it was the
opening of the points by an employee who was not authorised to do so that
caused the crash, before any attempt was made to open the points, Control
should have been contacted and the person performing the work should have
satisfied himself by observation that the train in No. 2 was in possetion of
a Section Authority for the move.

Bob.