Re: Independent Review of Rail Safety Arrangements in Australia

["Rod Gayford" <rjaygee@smartchat.net.au>]

Are any criminal charges going to be laid in this matter?
Cheers
Rod Gayford
Exnarc wrote in message <845ckv$2i2r$1@otis.netspace.net.au>...
>
>John Kerley <deaftech@ozemail.com.au> wrote in message
>jBk94.2700$n23.9002@ozemail.com.au">news:jBk94.2700$n23.9002@ozemail.com.au...
><snip>
>> > Doo and Train Staff & Ticket, (In Vic) we run it all the time on the
>> > Hurstbridge Line,
>> > If you haven't got the "Acre" Message you can't let another tain in the
>> > section to run up the rear of the first, we don't have time interval
>since
>> > DOO was introduced.
>> >
>> But what if the next train is let into the section without the "Acre"
>being
>> received? ( a not unknown occurrence and the biggest shortcoming in the
>S&T system).
>
>Why do we risk flying?? The Pilot might take off without permission, or
>someone might Hi-jack the plane??
>
>TS&T is like all systems that rely on the human element some where along
the
>way, what use is it if the guard or Second Person/Co Driver who is supposed
>to, forgets or is to lazy to be bothered to protect in the rear??
>
>Actually I don't recall ever hearing of a train entering a ST&T section
>without the "Acre" being received, (It may have happened but it is so rare
>that I can't recall it ever happening in my 37 year on the job)!!!
>
>> I suppose on today's railway with destaffing and removal of previously
>> existing safety systems, management can blame it on "human error" and
dump
>> it all on the poor blighter who made the mistake even though previously
>> existing preventative  systems had been removed.
>
>Removal of guards hasn't changed anything on TS&T, you still needed the
>Staff or after the "Acre"," the Ticket, the only thing missing with 2 man
>crewing or DOO is the "Notice of Train Ahead" form.
>
>>The management scapegoating of the poor blighter at Ararat in today's
press
>>is the latest example of this.
>
>I agree, however it still comes down to one thing, if the guy had done his
>job, (or more to the point) if he had let the qualified guys do their job
>instead of pre-empting the move Ararat would not have happened.
>
>The system at Ararat left a lot to be desired, but in the end it was the
>opening of the points by an employee who was not authorised to do so that
>caused the crash, before any attempt was made to open the points, Control
>should have been contacted and the person performing the work should have
>satisfied himself by observation that the train in No. 2 was in possetion
of
>a Section Authority for the move.
>
>Bob.
>
>