Re: Independent Review of Rail Safety Arrangements in Australia

["Exnarc" <gwrly@netspace.net.au>]

<snip>
> > Whilst I don't know the facts, it sounds like the human element not the
> Acre message was at fault.
> >
> Yes, Bob, this is what the whole debate is about.  We are all but human

Speak for your self!!!!<g>

>and hence human error is inevitable.  Therefore systems should be designed
as far as possible to mitigate the effect of human error by having other
checks
> in place.  i.e. it should take more than one error to cause a disaster.

>  With "Acre" messages it only takes the signaller to be distracted and
> forget that he has not received the "Acre", to hand over the staff to the
> driver.  Given that at most places where S&T is in use, the signaller is
> also responsible for station duties, it is not surprising that the
> occasional train gets sent out without the "Acre" having been received.
It is >an inherent weakness in the system and hence one of the reasons for
the
> previous requirement to protect in the rear when travelling on ticket.

Every System required someone to protect in the rear during failures, not
just TS&T. When 2 man crewing was introduced the rules were changed to make
provision for this, DOO is just an extension of that.

I have, over the years had loco failures etc that have stopped my train in
the section, the rules provided for either the Guard or the Fireman to
protect the train. In the case of the Guard, by the time he realised the
reason for the delay it was to late to bother protecting, (as was the case
at Barnawatha), remember we had no radio communication in those days. If a
guard protected 1800 m (Reg 239) every time a train stopped in a section,
there would have been guards left stranded all over the country side.

Before anything was done the Driver would send the Fireman to inform the
Guard, maybe a 10 minute walk or more away, he would then proceed to protect
his train, maybe another hours walk there and back over ballast.

Where is the protection there???

By this time, that negligent Signalman you're worried about could have
admitted 10 trains into the section.

<snip>

> With the Ararat disaster, we have an example of what happens when the
> additional checks have been removed and where just one error, opening the
> points without the section authority, caused an accident which could have
> been many times worse if it  had been a passenger train ploughing into 800
> tons of ballast.

Agreed, I'm not trying to justify the (lack of) Safeworking provisions at
Ararat, this thread developed into more than that, what I'm trying to
suggest (evidentally un-successfully) is that no matter what you do you will
never eliminate the human element, be it TS&T, ES, CTC, ATC, ASW etc.

Providing someone to sit at the back of a train in a wooden truck, didn't
improve the situation at all, (given the lack of communications available
back then). Today with all the radios, mobile phones etc. a guard at the
back of a train could be informed to protect easily enough, I agree, however
if we use these communications to do this why not use them to advise the
Train Controller and other trains instead???

> That there is no form of interlocking between releasing the key for the
> points and the issuing of the section authority, in this an electrical
> release by the train controller, in my view verges on the criminally
> negligent.  Alternatively, measures such as providing home signals
detected
> through plunger locked points, such as I noted at Hattah on this year's
> Steamrail trip to Mildura would provide the necessary protection.

Yes that is true, the points should have been better protected, but thats
got nothing to do with whether the Signalman has got the Acre or Line Clear,
The Section Pyreness - Maroona was "Clear" of trains. It was the guy who
opened the points that caused the disaster. Yes the system should have
stopped him, but when it all comes down to it, the final cause was the human
action.

>The current rampage of designalling stations and destaffing stations and
> trains, hence placing all the responsibility on the human frailty of one
> person, will ensure the Ararat is just one of many disasters to come.

I hope you are wrong and a little alarmist.

> Rail travel in Victoria, indeed in Australia, has become much less safe
> under the rule of the "economic rationalists".

Yes it has, but not every change has been a retro step.

For example: DOO in limited applications is safe (such as V/Line Pass, the
Met apply it etc), in the form that NRC propose (IMO) it isn't.

We can dwell on the past, be it travelling by steam hauled train, (an
admirable interest), memoirs, photography etc. but we also have to move with
the times for rail to remain viable, its a real world out there (unfortunate
phrase) and the competition is cutting costs to try to put us out of
business, so rail must adapt to survive. (But not cut corners on safety).
The removal of Guards was not a retrograde step, infact it has improved
operations in Victoria, (I am not speaking for other states). The abolition
of all non track circuited systems would be great, CTC EVERYTHING, however
its all got to be financed, on a line that has 1 or 2 train movements a day
it would be economical suicide to CTC where TS&T or TO will do the job. On
the Melbourne - Pyrenees section, ASW is not enough, it should IMO be CTC'd
as a matter of urgency.

Bob.