Re: Riggs Creek Smash (language warning)

[mauried@tpg.com.au (Maurie Daly)]

On Sun, 19 Nov 2000 21:23:21 +1100, "B."
<gunzel412@dingoblue.gunzel.net.au> wrote:

>Michael <usenet.spam@gunzel.net> wrote in message
>8FF1D4D08gunzelT333@203.164.20.149">news:8FF1D4D08gunzelT333@203.164.20.149...
>> mauried@tpg.com.au (Maurie Daly) wrote in
>> <3a17872c.38191772@can-news.tpg.com.au>:
>
>>>> Two of the above were not at the fault of the train crew.
>>>> They were allegedly at fault of the fuck-wit truck drivers
>>>> who drove out in front of the train.
>
>>> Id suggest that the Ararat accident also was not the fault
>>> of the train crew ,or indeed of Freight Australia, but was
>>> the fault of a totally unsafe safe working system.
>>> Key locked points on a main line which can be moved whilst a
>>> train is travelling towards them at full main line speed is
>>> hardly safe.
>
>It would be safe if the key *was* secured somewhere, In an
>Electric Crosslock, or a Lever on a Mechanical Frame.  Keeping it
>in a 5P locked box however...
>
>> This is what the report said as well, I think. The report
>> also recommended a few other key locations with similar
>> safeworking procedures be rectified.
>> It did not name the locations, but stated there were others
>> (6? 9?).
>
>I'm lead to believe that it is the Master Key Locked Junctions in
>TO territory.
>

Its really got to be secured in such a way that an authority granting
access into the section cant be issued whilst there are unlocked
points present.
The problem however with ASW is that there is no feedback whatsoever
of track or point conditions to the authority issuing computer,so that
the system as it stands cant ever be totally fail safe.
The only way the system can work is if the keys are locked in a safe
in the train controllers office and they cant be removed without
disabling the authority issuing computer, ie the equivalent of a CTC
systems inserting blocking jacks .

MD