Re: Safeworking Rules.

[mauried@commslab.gov.au (Maurie Daly)]

In article <j5j74.91$9N.2592@nsw.nnrp.telstra.net> "Notagunzel" <notagunzel@bigfoot.com> writes:
>From: "Notagunzel" <notagunzel@bigfoot.com>
>Subject: Re: Safeworking Rules.
>Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1999 16:26:28 +1100

>Maurie Daly <mauried@commslab.gov.au> wrote in message
>mauried.386.385CA8CE@commslab.gov.au">news:mauried.386.385CA8CE@commslab.gov.au...

>> No I dont want them all , but a sample might be useful.
>> For example are they worded in vague subjective terminology that means
>> differant things to differant people,or is there a list of defined
>procedures
>> hung un the wall of the signal box  which says something like

>> Before a proceed order may be issued to a driver to pass signal XXX at
>stop
>> the following procedures MUST be followed.

>> 1/ If it is beleived that signal XXX has failed , a qualified fitter MUST
>> examine the signal, interlocking equipment, motor points if any and
>> provide a written signed report confirming that the signal has failed.

>What if it's 0300 and the nearest fitter is fast asleep 100 kms away?

Well for a start,if the Infrastructure owner chooses to not have maintenance 
staff available to fix infrastructure when it fails,then its their fault.
Its all very well to argue that there is no risk in passing signals at stop.
Theres no risk to the infrastructure owner , but plenty of risk to the rail 
operator.
Irrespective of the judicial enquiry we now have 7 people dead at Glenbrook
due to passing signals at stop,theres plenty of risk.

These sorts of rules work OK when we have a vertically integrated environment
when the infrastructure owner also runs the trains,and therefore wears the 
risk themselves in the event of an accident,but it doesnt work where a 
multiplicity of rail operators run over someone elses tracks.
Using the argument that these accidents wouldnt happen if people didnt break 
the rules is simply plain naivety, 99% of all railway accidents are caused by 
human error,or people breaking rules.
I noted that on the ABC tonite , that a SRA spokesman indicated that the 
Waverton derailment was caused by ,Yes you guessed it "human error again."
ie someone broke the rules yet again.
Rules arnt worth the paper they are written on , if they get broken.
. 

>There is little risk if a signal has failed for whatever reason, for the
>driver to inspect/operate the points, and then for the driver to receive
>whatever authority to pass the signal at stop from the Controller/Signaller.
>It happens alot.

If it happens a lot , one can only conclude that the signalling systems are 
inherantly unreliable,(what does this say about maintenance practices.),or that
infrastructure owners are simply cost cutting.
Id also be interested to know how a driver verifies that a point machine which 
isnt a dual control one is locked,if its a facing point.


MD