Re: 3801 Conspiracy Theories and Urban Myths (was: Indian Pacific hits freight train - Who's the Responsible)

[David Johnson <trainman@ozemail.com.au>]

Bill McNiven wrote:

> After wandering away from Zanthus (Coonara?) here are two issues in this
> thread:
> 1    Why did the train stall?
> 2    Why did the signalling fail to protect the stalled train from a
> following train?
>
> On 2, I'm grateful for all the detail of sand and track circuits.

Tests show that 0.3mm of sand requires 800 volts to break down.  1 - 1.2mm of
sand requires 2000 to 3000 volts to break down.

The maximum sanding specified for a 38 class is 4 to 5 lb/min, however, after
the accident, 3801 was tested as having 7.22 lb/min on the leading wheels on the
up side.  The specification for the trailing sand is 1 to 2 lb/min, but was
later tested as 3.82 lb/min on the up side.  Down side sanding was within spec.

> On 1, I'm not sure that it's an established fact that an "idiot put the
> handbrake on".

OK...  Following is an extract from a statement of the person who checked them
at the time."
yyyyy and himself then walked along the train, all brakes appeared to be off
until he (xxxxx) observed a wheel with brake shoes applied on Car 3, FS2090.

He kicked the shoes but they did not move; he then touched the wheel which was
hot to touch.

yyyyy yyyyyyy also touched the wheel.

He then walked to the second bogie to see if its brakes were applied but as he
reached the bogie a person from inside the carriage called out that "the
handbrake was on, I have let it off". He is not sure if these were the exact
words but it was something similar. He noticed that the brakes on the rear bogie
of the carriage were not applied.

He walked back to the front of the carriage and noticed that the brakes on the
leading bogie were now released. yyyyy checked the brakes on this carriage were
fully released by also pulling the release handle to exhaust any brake cylinder
pressure. Although the brake shoes were free of the wheels a significant amount
of air was exhausted.
He then again checked the next car and although the brakes appeared to be
released, he was able to exhaust a small amount of air when he pulled the
release handle. He checked that the last two (2) cars, brakes were not visibly
applied and returned to the locomotive.
Barry and he climbed onto the locomotive and advised the crew that we had found
a handbrake that appeared to have been applied.
The Driver attempted to start the train but could not move more than about two
(2) metres. He remembers looking at the steam gauge which was showing a full
head of steam.
"

The conclusion of the report is as follows:
"
In complying with the Terms of Reference the Board is conscious of the Coronial
Enquiry which will be held into this collision. However, our investigations have
shown the following:

1.   Determine the Cause of the Collision:
The collision occurred after the intercity express N172 passed signal 34.6 which
was showing a green aspect. This green aspect was exhibited because sand on the
Up rail on track circuits 34.6B and 34.6C insulated the steam train NS24 from
the rail.

2.   Establish why NS24 steam train came to a stand and what occurred from that
time to the time of the collision.
There were no problems with NS24 particularly Locomotive 3801 prior to Boronia
No. 4 tunnel. At sometime during transit through No. 4 tunnel Locomotive 3801
suffered a severe wheel slip which lasted approximately 15 seconds. This of
course caused the train to lose momentum and the speed dropped from
approximately 30 kph to about 5-8kph. The Board believes there was a brake
applied in Car 3 (FS2090) prior to this time and with the drop in speed, a
significant increase occurred in the braking power due to the characteristics of
cast iron brake blocks versus speed.
The load for this train was calculated on the basis of a grade of 1:40 and the
train weight as per the diagram book. The calculated load was then confirmed by
tests using the dynamometer car.
Surveys of the grade show that the train came to a stand on a grade of 1:35.
Also test weighings of the type of car used in NS24 show the load to be
approximately 6 tonnes higher than indicated in the diagram book.
The moment the train came to a stand it is unlikely that it would have been able
to be lifted, especially when one takes into consideration the amount of sand on
the rail.
The Board, however, is of the opinion that the application of the handbrake on
Car 3 (FS2090) was the most significant cause of the train coming to a stand.
At the time of the wheel slip and thereafter, sand was applied in order to aid
contact between rail and driving wheels. The amount of sand discharged through
the sanding equipment was above the specified amount on the driver's side.
The Board believes that after coming to a stand there were three distinct
periods:
(a)  Attempts to restart while irregular application of brakes were being
investigated.
(b)  Having released the handbrake on FS2090 further attempts were made to move
the train which were unsuccessful.
(c)  Attempts were made to bunch the train by application of the handbrake on
the rear car and then powering to move forward.
During this time there was a conference between Driver and Guard and Guard and
Assistant Station. Master, Hawkesbury River.
There were a number of witnesses who noted repeated change of aspects of the
signal 33.4 distant which was located with two carriages to the rear of this
signal standing on track 34.6B.
At some time at least 2 minutes prior to the collision the signal 33.4 distant
showed a continuous green aspect which must have been for at least 10 seconds.
Coincidently with this the last two cars also failed to shunt track circuit
34.6B again because of sand insulation, causing signal 34.6 to change its aspect
from red to green.

3.    Establish the details of the operation of N172 (double deck intercity)
from Gosford to the time of the collision.
>From the time the Driver of N172 accepted the road at signal 34.6 (green aspect)
the collision was inevitable in the absence of protection in the rear of NS24.
N172 departed Gosford at 1829 hours and passed Hawkesbury River signalbox at
1847 hours and arrived at signal 34.6 at approximately 1849 hours. The Driver
discussed the reason for the signal 34.6 being at red with the Assistant Station
Master at Hawkesbury River and then remained at that signal until approximately
13 minutes later when the Driver received a green aspect at signal 34.6 and
moved passed it. Two minutes later the train emerged from Boronia 3 tunnel at
approximately 60kph, having a sighting distance of about 60 metres. The Driver
would not have been able to stop the train prior to the collision or make any
significant reduction in speed.

4.   Examine the implementation of emergency procedures after the collision
occurred.
The Board accepts that all railway protection procedures after the collision
were implemented quickly and satisfactorily. The emergency services were
summonsed in the first case by a railway employee who was observing the train
from Oliver's Garage across the valley.
The Board has some disquiet over the time taken to advise the relevant emergency
authorities by on duty staff. The actual performance of all emergency services
(including rail) was first class.

5.    In respect of Items 2, 3 and 4, what deviations were detected from
standard maintenance operating practices and procedures.
The following matters appear to be requiring further examination after the
Coroner has completed his Inquiry:
(a) State of the locomotive sanding equipment. (b) The use of sand prior to the
collision.
(c) Irregular use of unauthorised persons for brake examination.
"

--
David Johnson
trainman@ozemail.com.au
http://www.ozemail.com.au/~trainman/