Re: Dr Beeching

[news@nospam.freeserve.co.uk (Tony Polson)]

On Thu, 07 Jan 1999 15:52:43 GMT, in uk.railway Barry S. Doe
<tbc002@argonet.co.uk> wrote:

>I disagree. He did not achieve what he set out to do and the railways
>continued to lose money. The answer was only much later seen by governments,
>viz., that there was no point trying to make them pay and instead they
>should be subsidised provided they were socially necessary.

I respect your point of view (and your passion for railways) but the facts do
not support your view.  Beeching's report was commissioned after vast amounts of
taxpayers' money had been squandered on the Modernisation Plan to no avail.  The
result, instead of the modern, economic railway that had been promised, was a
railway that applied modern technology to old services without thinking whether
those services fitted the needs of a changing economy.

The British Railways Board squandered £1.5 billion (in 1955 money) on the
Modernisation Plan without ever managing to turn around the losses.  Indeed
those losses mounted rapidly and became unaffordable.  The reason the Labour
Government implemented the Beeching closures is simple; in 1964-68 the country
was in an economic crisis and could not afford to do otherwise.

The sad thing about Beeching is that his report (and his axe) should never have
been necessary.  The reason why they were necessary is simple; it was the
failure of the British Railways Board in the 1950s to identify and tackle the
growing problems on the railways.  Instead the Board took the easy route and
threw huge amounts of money at them through the Modernisation Plan.  

IMHO the two massive errors of judgement in the Modernisation Plan were 
(1) Dieselisation using untried designs from a hatful of inexperienced diesel
locomotive builders and (2) massive investment in marshalling yards at the time
wagonload freight was in rapid decline.  You might wish to add the choice of
Dieselisation instead of widespread electrification and application of expensive
solutions to the retention of remote branch lines which had never been economic
from the time they were built.

It's easy to say that money should have been found for keeping everyone's
favourite line/service/locomotive/rolling stock but Governments have to make
tough decisions regarding bigger and wider issues such as health, education and
social security.  Money had to be found for building roads as car ownership
boomed and car usage became more affordable.  I would not be at all happy if I
had to drive my car in 1998 on roads fit for the 1950s - although many of them
still appear that way.

>By this time it was too late for much of the network. However, some branches
>that managed to keep going (usually as replacement buses couldn't get to the
>local stations) have since greatly improved and one can only wonder as to
>how well some of the prime routes that closed would now be doing had they
>continued (S & D, Borders, Great Central -  and note some of them are down
>for re-opening which proves my point).

Are you seriously suggesting that unlimited amounts of taxpayers' money should
have been used to continue to pay for all these lines for 30 years or more until
a possible use could be found for them?  Governments have to raise money for
expenditure by either taxation or borrowing, which later has to be repaid by
taxation anyway, so where would this money come from?

>One should also remember the dishonest way Beeching obtained figures to
>prove closure need. Seaside branch termini like Swanage, Lyme Regis,
>Sidmouth etc, were closed on the grounds of the revenue collected at those
>stations only (or any others on the branch) and no account was taken
>whatsoever of tickets sold say, in London, to get to those places - despite
>the fact that the latter revenue greatly exceeded the former.

Beeching's job was made incredibly difficult by the failure of the railways to
have any credible accounting system.  You are quite wrong to criticise Beeching
for "dishonesty" when the truth is that *British Railways* had failed to
appreciate where branch line revenues came from.  They were completely unable to
identify which lines made a reasonable return and which lost money.  They were
completely unable to suggest where savings could be made because their financial
systems were either non-existent or in a sorry state.  

Beeching had no option but to work with the information he was given; it is
pointless to blame him for decisions he had no option but to make on the basis
of bad information - he could only do his best with the information he was
given.

>In short Beeching was appointed by a government that doubted rail had any
>furture except for a few trunk routes and commuter lines 

If the Government thought this way it was only because no useful and credible
information was coming from the British Railways Board ..

>and told to prove it and ditch most of it.

You do yourself no credit by stating this.  It is completely without foundation.
Beeching's brief was to stem the losses, which were unaffordable.  He had no
brief whatsoever as to what to prove and what to ditch, starting as he did with
a blank sheet of paper.  

> Its been said vefore but worth repeating: the
>network was like a tree - cut the branches away too much and the trunk dies.
>Put another way, few people railhead or catch buses for part fo the journey
>and tend, where possible, to drive all the way, meaning a loss for the main
>trunk leg as well.

I've no doubt Beeching was well aware of this.  But the figures provided by BR
told another story.  Had the BR accounts been competent it would have been much
easier for Beeching to make a very different judgement on branch lines.  As it
was, BR were unable to provide figures to justify retention of many lines that
should probably never have been closed.

>If only we had modernised the whole system instead of only part of it we
>would now have a very different society with fewer roads, a better
>environment and towns - and more people alive. 

Take off those rose tinted spectacles, please.  It's all too easy to make cheap
points that will gain support from railway enthusiasts who (like me) mourn the
passing of every station, line, loco or piece of rolling stock.  

But the *fact* is that the Conservative Government of the 1950s gave the British
Railways Board £1.5 billion to spend on the Modernisation Plan with *precisely*
the brief you suggest.  All they managed to buy with £1.5 billion after several
years was ... Beeching.  (Is it any wonder the Tories are anti-railway?)

Just think what you could do with today's equivalent, probably £30 billion at
1990s prices.  You'd be able to buy Railtrack, all the TOCs, all the ROSCOs, all
the infrastructure companies, etc.  and still have lots of money left over to
invest and modernise the 1990s railway.  So just where did all that money go?

If you seek someone to blame, look before Beeching.  Don't shoot the messenger.

--
Tony Polson, North Yorkshire, UK