Re: SAW/ASW - was Re: Computer Question - DTC

[mauried@commslab.gov.au (Maurie Daly)]

In article <EgL44.130$BT6.3846@nsw.nnrp.telstra.net> "Notagunzel" <notagunzel@bigfoot.com> writes:
>From: "Notagunzel" <notagunzel@bigfoot.com>
>Subject: Re: SAW/ASW - was Re: Computer Question - DTC
>Date: Sun, 12 Dec 1999 22:02:38 +1100

>Maurie Daly <mauried@commslab.gov.au> wrote in message
>mauried.376.385337FD@commslab.gov.au">news:mauried.376.385337FD@commslab.gov.au...

>> Further on re ASW , whats happened as a result of the Ararat accident.
>> Since Glenbrook , this accident seems to have gone very quiet.

>The word trackside is that you will probably find the enquiry will focus on
>the premature operation of the down end points for the departure of the
>Ballast by a 3rd person.  And the lack of security provided by the Annett
>Lock.

>> Is there any form of inquiry , and who is conducting it.

>AFAIK the ATSB is involved, at the invitation of the Vic Govt.

>> At the least, until such an inquiry concludes and exonerates ASW, if
>indeed it
>> will,then ARTC should in the interim cancel it and introduce an
>alternative.
>> Indeed, what is the alternative when ASW fails for any other reasons?

>The suggestion that ASW should be "cancelled" is slightly bizarre, as what
>is the alternative?  Manual Train Orders?  Hardly an improvement...

>There are 2 ways of 'fallback' working if something is wrong with the ASW.
>Electronic/Manual is when the LSDU on a particular loco dies, involving the
>Office Computer generating the Authority, which is then transmitted by voice
>to the driver, who takes it down on his Manual Authority form.  Full Manual
>working is where the Office Computer dies, so all trains receive Manual
>Authorities, generated by the Controller off his Paper Graph (which usually
>doesn't exist on the controllers desk).  So you could say it sort of
>devolves towards Train Order working in a way...

>--
>Mr Notagunzel.
>Rail Transportation Connoisseur
>notagunzel@bigfoot.com
>(Regrets to announce there will be no further moves at
>http://www.geocities.com/nota_gunzel
>until further notice is issued from this office)


As far as cancelling ASW goes in the interim is not bizzarre at all.
In this accident ,the safeworking system (ASW) was directly involved in 
failing to prevent it .
Until an inquiry is held and ASW is cleared of any failure,continuing to use 
it is effectively pre-empting the outcome of any inquiry, ie the operators of 
the safeworking system are effectively saying that theres nothing wrong with 
it. (Ie its safe).

This type of attitude was also sadly in evidence with the Glenbrook 
accident with the CEO of SRA indicating on the day of the accident that the 
safeworking system had performed perfectly.

With more modern ? safeworking systems like ATC and CTC , we have pilot staffs 
when the safeworking system fails or is cancelled.
It would seem to me that at least a pilot staff system could be introduced in 
the interim period.

MD