Re: British Accident 1sr Report Out - Thames Driver Not Being Blamed At This Point

[Mike Roebuck <Mike.Roebuck@cobblers.datacomm.ch>]

On Thu, 21 Oct 1999 00:04:55 +1000, "Derick Wuen"
<cullend@webone.com.au> wrote:

snip

>2. Consensus on immediate cause seems to be Thames train committing SPAD.
>Why is not known.
>
correct

>3. It seems to be a re-run of Southall 1997, the enquiry into which was only
>just starting last week. In fact at least one GW car involved in this year's
>horror was also in Southall!
>
definitely not a re-run of Southall, which was caused by a combination
of an inattentive driver, and both on-train safety systems, which
would (should) have made him more attentive, being out of action. A
secondman in the cab would also have prevented the accident.

>I find it very difficult to assimilate the fact that I understand S109 has
>been SPADDED eight times in 9 years, and nothing seems to have actually
>happened except memo wars and meetings which drew up "action" lists never
>implemented.

you're not the only one, I assure you

snip
>
>My solution?
>
>1. Reregulate safety aspects with one authority with no other duties /
>conflicts of interest.

The Government has stated its intention to remove responsibility for
rail safety from the Infrastructure operator, Railtrack. I assume it
will pass to a single body with no conflict of interest

>2. Install auto train stop in London metro area.

It (ATP) is installed on the line where the accident took place. The
suburban unit which SPADed was not equipped with it. The HST was, but
it was not switched on (although this had no bearing on the accident).
The suburban unit was equipped with AWS, which gives a visual and
audible warning in the cab of the state of signals ahead. There are
two apparent problems with it: the warnings for single yellow, double
yellow and red signals are identical, and suburban services on
London's very busy railways frequently run under yellow aspects for
long stretches of track and time - this has led to suspicions of
familiarity syndrome, i.e. reflex cancellation of the warnings by the
driver

>3. Any driver SPADDING gets instantly dismissed (if survives), by law.
>
>The last may sound draconian and unfair given the poor engineering and
>management, but it might make drivers slow down and look at signals before
>proceeding, even at cost of disruption of operator's schedules.

It is a totally unfair suggestion. The majority of SPADs are signal
overshoots by a couple of metres caused sometimes by bad judgement on
the part of the driver, but also by slippery rails, etc. There is no
element of deliberate action here, and dismissal is not justified in
such cases. Every SPAD in the UK, without exception, is investigated.
Drivers are relieved of their turn of duty and drink/drugs - tested.
Disciplinary procedures are followed, but a dismissal would only
follow if the transgression really was severe.

 This would
>start to hit operators where it hurts (hip pocket) and they would then
>pressure infrastructure providers to lift game.
>
it would only hit the operators' pockets if they incurred penalties
for late running. If such a system were to be introduced , the
timetable would be recast to take account of the longer journey times.
So no penalty payments.

>Now for an urban myth in the making.....
>
>The was an Australian who survived the Paddington crash. A few weeks earlier
>he was on the Qantas 747 which went into the golf-course at Bangkok. And a
>few weeks before that he was in a serious car-crash in Australia. So maybe
>we have the element which brought all the possiblities of management and
>engineering failure to a head?

This made the news over here too, although I personally hadn't heard
about the car crash.

cheers

--
Mike Roebuck, Riehen, Switzerland  icq#7018252 
'53 M Y* L-- KQ+ C c++ B11 Sh11 FCYork SSWFC R(Basle)
Reply To: mike(dot)roebuck(at)datacomm(dot)ch