Re: Outcomes of the Hines Hill crash.

Maurie Daly (mauried@commslab.gov.au)
Wed, 11 Jun 1997 03:40:43 GMT

>Currently on ASW there are no distant signals so even if you are not
>crossing anything and have an authority for the next section you have to
>slow down in a fog just in case the main line home signal does not clear.
>This, of course, wastes brakes, fuel, time and increases track occupation
>time.

>Most drivers that I have spoken to who work over the plains would have
>preferred CTC. It seems that the problem was not so much the cost of
>installing CTC but the cost of maintaining it. CTC with axle counters would
>reduce this cost tremendously.

>Train Orders is considered safe enough for other main lines in Australia so
>I don't know why it wouldn't have worked across the plains. Train orders
>with DICE would be heaven. (DICE is driver initiated control of equipment -
>basically radio controlled, self restoring points). DICE has been installed
>at Gheringhap and seems to work well except that it still imposes a 5
>minute rundown to take the loop (a little bit of overkill, methinks). I'm
>talking about real train orders not NSW version or ASW (Alternative to
>SafeWorking). Track Warrant Control is another option.

>--
>Cheers Krel

>"Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguisable from magic" -
>Clarke's Law

Could you kindly clarify one point for me.
I take it that the arrival home for ASW normally shows red and clears to green
when a train hits the arrival track ccts.
What happens when 2 trains are approaching an ASW loop in opposite directions
at the same time , and both hit the arrival track ccts at the same time.
Do both arrival home signals clear to green,or just one or none?
It would seem a bizzarre situation if they both cleared at once.
Also in the case of DICE how are the points and arrival signals interlocked,ie
what stops 2 drivers from issuing a conflicting set of instructions to the
same point motor, ie if both drivers inadvertantly try to drive both trains
into the loop road.
Also are the Radioed Instructions to the interlocking equip encrypted in some
way so as to prevent the operation of non intended actions.
eg a train arriving at Gheringhap instructs the point motor to reverse to the
Loop Road , and due to anomolous propagation the instruction is also received
by the Interlocking equip at Wingeel Loop. (What happens)?
Radio based safeworking is OK provided that the train is actually where the
safeworking system thinks it is,which requires an independant feedback path
for location verification, track ccts or axle counters provide this , could
also be provided by GPS.
I dont beleive the PTC ASW system has any independant locational verification
ability.

cheers
MD